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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN THE COURTS
Neil Kinkopf*
Exploring the role of the judicial branch of the federal government in Clinton-
era executive privilege claims, Neil Kinkopf suggests that courts have
misunderstood executive privilege. Professor Kinkopfpoints out thatfederal courts
have given different treatment to executive privilege claims asserted in judicial and
congressional arenas, protecting the Judiciaryfrom encroachment by the executive
branch, while avoiding becoming involved in controversies among the political
branches. He argues that the judicial confusion about executive privilege stems
from the fact that courts have interpreted cases such as Clinton v. Jones to be about
the separation ofpowers between the executive andjudicial branches, rather than
about the interpretation of federal jurisdictional statutes. Professor Kinkopf
proposes judicial and legislative responses that could provide remedies for the
problem ofjudicial misunderstanding of executive privilege in the future.
INTRODUCTION
The Clinton Administration is fertile ground for an examination of executive
privilege. No administration since President Nixon's has yielded such a spate of
executive privilege controversies. These controversies play out in a variety of fora
and are resolved most frequently through the process of political accommodation.'
This Essay focuses on a relatively rare setting: the judicial treatment of executive
privilege claims.2
Exactly what "executive privilege" means has never been entirely clear. While
presidents since George Washington have asserted some form of the privilege, it is
emblematic ofthe privilege's mutability that the phrase "executive privilege" was not
coined until the Eisenhower Administration.' Executive privilege is remarkably
" Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I wish to thank
David Barron, Jonathan Entin, Dawn Johnsen, and Eric Segall.
See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 142-57 (1994); Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since
United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation andAccommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127,
1140 (1999).
2 The Reagan and Bush Administrations spawned some relevant judicial doctrine,
especially in connection with the investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal, but it does not
compare in quality or quantity to the judicial response to the Clinton Administration.
3 See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's
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protean; it can assume a seemingly limitless array of forms and, consequently, is
difficult to grasp. Regarding executive privilege as a heading for these multifarious
claims is a standard account.4 For the purposes of this Essay, "executive privilege"
refers to the variety of privileges and immunities, grounded in the constitutional
structure of the presidency, that allow the President to withhold information or refrain
from participation in the processes of the other branches. These privileges and
immunities include the state secrets privilege, the presidential communications
privilege, and the presidential immunity from civil suit for official acts.' In addition
to asserting several of the sanctioned categories of executive privilege listed above,6
the Clinton Administration has claimed a number of privileges and immunities that
had never before been the subject of judicial rulings, including the government
attorney-client privilege7 and temporary presidential immunity from civil suit.'
The Clinton Administration has seen two important developments in the judicial
doctrine of separation of powers. First, in the twenty-five years since the Supreme
Court held, in United States v. Nixon,9 that executive privilege is grounded in the
constitutionally created separation of powers, the Court has substantially developed
Shadow, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069, 1069 (1999).
4 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769-71 (3d ed. 2000).
' See id It is tempting to add a category that arises by negative implication, an ultra
vires privilege. Under this privilege, the President properly may refuse to comply with a
demand for evidence that the requester has no authority to demand. The typical case
involves a congressional demand for documents or testimony that do not fall within
Congress' investigative or oversight authority. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder & Neil
Kinkopf, What about Burton's Contempt for the Constitution?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 17,
1998, at 25. The ultra vires privilege would not fall within the definition offered above
because it is grounded in the constitutional attributes of Congress rather than the
presidency. For this reason, it is not a power or privilege inhering in the President.
6 See, e.g., Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Keeps Papers On Haiti From House;
Executive Privilege Invoked in Panel's Probe of Killings, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1996, at
A20 (reporting on President Clinton's refusal to "turn over 47 documents subpoenaed by
House investigators probing whether the administration knew that security agents of Haiti's
U.S.-backed government had murdered political opponents");Walter Pincus, Official Balks
At Hearing On Bosnia, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1996, at A6 (reporting on a Clinton
Administration official's claim to executive privilege regarding an investigation into the
Administration's "policy of tolerating Iran's shipment of arms to Bosnia's Muslim-led
government in 1994 and 1995 in violation of a U.N. embargo").
7 See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
S See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997). The Supreme Court, of course,
already had recognized absolute presidential immunity for acts taken within the broad
parameters of office. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,756 (1982). In Jones, President
Clinton asserted a temporary immunity from suits arising from events that preceded his
election as President. See Jones, 520 U.S. at 681.
9 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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and consolidated its understanding of separation of powers.'0 . Federal courts in the
Clinton era have adapted the Nixonholding to this recently consolidated doctrine.
When ruling on the Clinton claims, the courts have followed the standard account,
regarding each claim as an application of the general separation of powers principle,
rather than as a distinct privilege." Thus, courts have accepted the notion that this
welter of factually disparate claims actually forms a single doctrinal category. 2
Second, despite having identified the relevant framework and legal principles for
resolving executive privilege claims, the courts repeatedly have misapplied the
doctrinal framework to those claims.'
3
In resolving the Clinton-era claims of executive privilege, the courts have
followed another element of the standard account of executive privilege-the validity
of any specific claim of executive privilege will depend on whether it is asserted in
the congressional orjudicial arena.' 4 When the privilege is asserted in response to a
congressional inquiry, the President's claim is pitted against Congress' constitutional
powers of investigation and oversight.'" The courts are reluctant to get involved in
30 See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
According to this principle, no branch may act in a way that prevents another branch
from performing its constitutionally assigned role. An action that threatens to do so is
unconstitutional unless its impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of the encroaching branch. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see also infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
2 A number of the novel privilege claims that the Clinton Administration asserted do
not fall within this category because the Administration grounded them in the distinct
category of common law privileges. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes
the federal courts to develop the common law of evidentiary privileges. These common law
privileges are not constitutionally mandatory and may be repealed or altered by statute.
Thus, the Administration's claim of government attomey-clieit privilege did not raise
a novel claim of constitutional executive privilege. Insofar as the government attorney-
client privilege is asserted in the context of communications between the President and a
government attorney acting within the scope of an attorney-client relationship, it is identical
to the presidential communications privilege. The government attorney-client privilege's
much broader application--to executive branch lawyering that does not implicate the
President-is an instance of the common law evidentiary privilege. See In re Lindsey, 158
F.3d at 1267-68.
The protective function privilege raised by the Clinton Administration was not asserted
to be a presidential privilege. Instead, the protective function privilege was raised as a
privilege of the Secretary of the Treasury, who asked the court to recognize the privilege
under its Rule 501 authority. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(per curiam).
"s See infra Pt. II.
14 See generally ROZELL, supra note 1, at 142-57 (discussing the potential political
nature of congressional response to claims of executive privilege).
"s See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699-700 (1988) (asserting executive privilege
in response to congressional oversight hearings into the administration of the Superfund
by the EPA); Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Senate
2000]
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a dispute between the political branches.' 6 When the President asserts the privilege
in a judicial proceeding, the courts understand the primary separation of powers
battle line to be drawn between the President's constitutional powers and those of the
Judiciary.'7 This assumption, however, is a misunderstanding. The forum does not
define the separation of powers combatants. Executive privilege cases arising in the
judicial arena do not implicate significantly the Judiciary's constitutional role or
authority. This misunderstanding has led courts astray during the Clinton era,
especially in Clinton v. Jones. 8
This Essay seeks to explain how the courts have misunderstood executive
privilege and to propose remedies for that misunderstanding. The Essay will set forth
the doctrine of separation of powers and locate executive privilege controversies
within that doctrine, including those involving President Clinton. With this
background, the Essay then will explain how the Judiciary's misperception that its
own turf was at stake in these cases led it to misapply the separation of powers
doctrine. Finally, this Essay will offer a specific legislative proposal to redress this
error.
I. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court has recognized that the categories of executive privilege flow
from a common source-the constitutional separation of powers.' 9 United States v.
Select Committee, President Nixon had invoked executive privilege to protect recorded
conversations between him and his aides that were the subject of a subpoena duces tecum
by the Senate Select Committee investigating wrongdoing in connection with the 1972
presidential campaign and election. See Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 726-27.
16 See Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 731 (applying a presumption of privilege when
claimed by the President, unless Congress demonstrates that the requested evidence is
critical to its function); cf Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring):
[T]he 'contest here . . . is in substance an interbranch controversy about
calibrating the legislative and executive powers, as well as an intrabranch
dispute between segments of Congress itself. Intervention in such a controversy
would risk damaging the public confidence that is vital to the functioning of the
Judicial Branch by embroiling the federal courts in a power contest nearly at
the height of its political tension.
' See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 151-52.
IS 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,708 (1974). Numerous commentators agree
that the Court in Nixon was correct on this point. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 1, at 142-
57; Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1421, 1422 (1999) (arguing that the dispute in Nixon was nonjusticiable under the
separation of powers doctrine); Johnsen, supra note 1, at 1140 ("[E]xecutive privilege is
indispensable to the functioning of our system of checks and balances and separation of
powers."). Nevertheless, some remain convinced that the Constitution's textual
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Nixon expressly sets forth this position. Nixon recognized executive privilege. as
rooted in the constitution.2 °
Seven aides and advisers to President Richard Nixon, each serving on the staff
of either the White House or the Committee to Re-Elect the President, were indicted
for a variety of crimes. 2' Although the President was not indicted, he was named as
an unindicted co-conspirator. 2  The district court granted the special prosecutor's
motion for a subpoena duces tecum to the President requiring him to submit audio
tapes of conversations with several of his indicted aides relating to their activities.3
President Nixon refused to comply fully with the subpoena, asserting executive
privilege.24
The Supreme Court concluded that the separation of powers encompasses the
concept of executive privilege. 2' Although the Court did not articulate a specific
separation of powers principle from which the privilege derives, it did conclude that
the privilege is necessary to the proper functioning of the executive branch.2 6 The
Court further concluded that recognizing a qualified, rather than an absolute,
privilege under the facts of Nixon would not violate the separation of powers
doctrine. 7
At the time Nixon was decided, the Supreme Court had not attempted to
articulate a doctrinal framework to govern the resolution of separation of powers
disputes. In the years since, however, the Court has set forth such a framework.
Outside the limited group of cases in which a textual provision is directly
controlling,28 the Court looks to whether one branch has acted to aggrandize its own
silence-buttressed by its structure and original understanding-refutes any claim of
executive privilege. See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
MYTH (1974); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality
of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143 (1999). I accept as correct the Court's view,
though it is beyond the scope of this Essay to attempt to resolve the disagreement in the
literature.
20 The Court declared, "The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." Nixon, 418
U.S. at 708.
"2 See id. at 687.
22 See id
23 See id. at 687-88.
24 See id. at 688.
21 See id at 703.
26 See id
27 See id. at 706. As to Nixon's claim, the Court ruled that the qualified privilege was
overcome by the demonstrated and particularized need of the criminal justice system. See
id. at 713.
28 See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (applying bicameralism and
presentment requirements to a delegation to the President); Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (applying bicameralism and presentment
requirements to a legislative veto); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-43 (1976) (per
2000]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
power.29 If a branch has acted to aggrandize its own power, the action-typically
enactment of a statute--is unconstitutional.30 For all other separation of powers
cases, the Court applies a general separation of powers principle: no branch may
"prevent[ ] [another] Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions,"'" unless it isjustified by an overriding need to promote objectives within
the constitutional authority of the acting branch.32
The general separation of powers principle, in its formulation and its application,
is extremely deferential. The only instances in which a statute has been found
unconstitutional under that principle involved congressional encroachments on the
Judiciary.33 When the Court's own power is not at stake, the Judiciary has deferred
to the judgment of the political branches, expressed by enactment through
bicameralism and presentment, that the statute or statutorily authorized action at
issue does not prevent Congress or the President from fulfilling its constitutional
roles.34
curiam) (applying the Appointments Clause).
29 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding that the
constitutional separation of powers was violated when a provision of the Securities
Exchange Act directed courts to reopen final judgments).
30 See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). In Bowsher,
the Court struck down the Gramm-Rudman Balanced Budget Act, which authorized the
Comptroller General to make cuts necessary to bring the federal budget into balance.
Because Congress had statutory authority to remove the Comptroller, the Court concluded
that Congress could control the Comptroller and, through him, could control the power to
make budget cuts. Therefore, Congress had aggrandized its own power. This rationale
would have been a more persuasive basis for the Court's holding in Chadha. See TRIBE,
supra note 4, at 678-79. The Court also recharacterized one of its earlier cases, Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which declared unconstitutional a statute requiring the
President to receive the advice and consent of the Senate before removing a postmaster first
class. The Court in Bowsher contended that the constitutional defect of the removal
provision was that it aggrandized Congress' power. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 724-26.
" Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
32 See id. This formulation has been repeated often. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681 (1997); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 381 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
" See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240.
34 See generally Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization:
Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-
Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 348-57 (1998) (outlining the major court
decisions on separation of powers).
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II. APPLYING THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK TO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
A. The Espy Case
In the recent spate of cases involving the Clinton Administration, the courts
consistently have applied this general separation of powers principle to determine
whether to recognize a privilege and how to define the parameters of the privilege.35
The most significant case dealing with a claim of the presidential communications
privilege did not involve an investigation of the President himself; instead, it
concerned an investigation of the Administration's first Secretary of Agriculture,
Mike Espy.
Espy was the subject of allegations that he had received illegal gifts from
lobbyists and entities subject to the Department of Agriculture's regulatory
jurisdiction. 6 These allegations led to the appointment ofan independent counsel to
investigate and, ultimately, prosecute Espy.3 President Clinton also responded to the
allegations. He ordered the White House Counsel to conduct a separate investigation
to determine whetherthe President should take any disciplinary or executive action.3"
These distinct investigations collided when the grand jury, at the behest of the
independent counsel, subpoenaed all of the records, notes, and documents that the
White House Counsel had compiled in the course of its investigation.39
The President asserted privilege over eighty-four documents covered by the grand
jury subpoena, including documents that were not prepared for the President and were
never viewed by the President personally.4" The court thus was asked to determine:
"How far down the line does the presidential communications privilege go?"' To
resolve this question, the court applied the general separation of powers principle:
"The ultimate question is whether restricting the presidential communications
privilege to communications that directly involve the President will 'impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty.'"'2 The court then concluded
" See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681; In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Espy].
36 See Espy, 121 F.3d at 734.
37 See id Espy was acquitted on all 30 counts that were submitted to the jury; the judge
dismissed eight additional counts. See Neil A. Lewis,-Espy is Acquitted on Gifts Received
While in Cabinet, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al.
38 See Espy, 121 F.3d at 735. The White House Counsel recommended that the
President take no action in large part because Espy already had tendered his resignation and
made payments reimbursing all of the questionable gratuities. The President accepted his
counsel's recommendation. See id.
39 See id.
40 See id
41 Id. at 746.
42 Id. at 751 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988)). Judge Wald's
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that the general separation of powers principle required that it apply the presidential
communications privilege to communications received by presidential advisors within
the scope of their advisory roles.43
As in United States v. Nixon, the court in Espy ruled that the presidential
communications privilege is a qualified privilege." The court returned to Nixon for
guidance in determining whether the President ultimately could withhold the
subpoenaed documents.45 The court read Nixon to require a balance between the
President's interest in confidentiality and the public interest in disclosure.46 The
public interest, however, is described in terms of the judicial role, as it was in
Nixon.47 The court in Espy cited Nixon in characterizing the interest that weighs
against the President's interest as the "need for evidence in a pending criminal trial"
in which the evidence bears on, or is relevant to, "an accurate judicial
determination. '
The court in Espy then concluded that the balance would require the President to
disclose privileged information whenever the evidence is "directly relevant" and is not
available "with due diligence" from another source.49 The first requirement-that the
evidence be directly relevant--does not obviously yield a significant change from the
generally applicable discovery requirement that evidence be relevant. The opinion
itself concedes, "In practice, this component can be expected to have limited
impact."50 Thus, the court in Espy reduced the separation of powers to a rule of
etiquette: a prosecutor should approach the President only if the evidence sought is
not reasonably available elsewhere.
B. In re Lindsey and In re Sealed Case
In two of the most widely reported Clinton-era cases, the Administration asked
the courts to recognize previously untested privilege claims: the government attorney-
client privilege and the protective function, or secret service, privilege. Neither case
opinion poses this question within the broad separation of powers framework, first noting
that "'even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself, ... the separation-of-powers
doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional
duties."' Id. (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996)).
41 See id. at 751-52.
44 See id. at 752.
41 See id. at 753-54.
46 See id. at 753.
47 For a discussion of this aspect of Nixon, see infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
48 Espy, 121 F.3d at 753-54 (emphasis added). The court made these statements in the
course of denying an argument that the judicial "need" for the evidence be
greater-specifically that it be "critical" to an accurate judicial determination. See id. at
754.
49 Id. at 754.
'o Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 17(c)).
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yielded a Supreme Court opinion. The Administration did not contend in either case
that the privilege was constitutionally based. Instead, the Administration asked the
District of Columbia Circuit to recognize the privilege under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, which authorizes the federal courts to develop common law evidentiary
privileges.5
The court recognized the government attorney-client privilege, but held that the
privilege dissolves in the context of a criminal proceeding.52 In this setting, the
relevant inquiry focuses on the presidential communications privilege as expounded
in Espy. 3 Thus, the availability of the privilege comes under the general separation
of powers principle.54 The President did not assert the protective function privilege.
Instead, the Secretary of the Treasury asserted this privilege to prevent Secret Service
officers from being required to testify before the grand jury." Because the President
was absent from this proceeding and the Treasury Department did not raise the
separation of powers issue, the court did not discuss the general separation of powers
principle and resolved the case under its common law precedents as authorized by
Rule 501.56
C. Clinton v. Jones
The lone case to draw an opinion on the merits from the Supreme Court is also
the most prominent privilege case of the Clinton Administration: Clinton v. Jones."
In Jones, President Clinton asserted temporary immunity from civil suit for actions
undertaken before he took office as President."8 Thus, he sought to extend a qualified
application of Nixon v. Fitzgerald.59 In Nixon, the Supreme Court held that the
President enjoys absolute immunity from civil suit for actions undertaken within the
broad parameters of his official capacity. 60 The Court rejected President Clinton's
claim of temporary immunity.
6
'
President Clinton's principal argument relied on the separation of powers
principle. He contended that requiring the President to submit to civil litigation while
"' See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); In re Sealed
Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
52 See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1271-73.
13 See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1268; In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075.
54 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
" See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1074. The Secret Service is a bureau within the
Department of the Treasury.
56 See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075-79.
s 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
s See id at 684.
'9 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
60 See id at 757-58.
61 See Jones, 520 U.S. at 684.
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in office would undermine seriously his ability to fulfill his constitutional role, thus
violating the general separation of powers principle."2 The Supreme Court agreed
that the President had identified the relevant question.3 In articulating the general
separation of powers test, the Court "recognized that 'even when a branch does not
arrogate power to itself.., the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch
not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties."'" The Court,
however, was unpersuaded by the President's contention that submitting to civil
litigation would undermine impermissibly his ability to perform his constitutional
duties.6 :
The Court believed that requiring the President to defend a civil lawsuit would
not place a substantial burden on him. It found support for this view in history; only
three presidents had ever been subject to suit for their private conduct.6 The
Supreme Court also anticipated that the district court would be capable, through
sensitive case management, to accommodate the schedule and other exigencies of the
presidential defendant.67 As to the President's concern that his amenability to suit
would "generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous
litigation," Justice Stevens assured that "[m]ost frivolous and vexatious litigation is
terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any personal
involvement by the defendant" 8
The Supreme Court, however, did not stop at rejecting the President's "predictive
judgment" that allowing civil lawsuits to proceed against him while in office would
disrupt his presidency seriously.6 9 The Court also assertedwhat it perceived as the
Judiciary's own institutional interest in the question: the vitality of its "traditional
Article III jurisdiction."7 The Court saw two components of that traditional
constitutional jurisdiction implicated in Jones. First, "[W]hen the President takes
official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within
the law."' Second, the President is subject to judicial process in "appropriate
62 See id at 697.
613 See id at 698.




61 Id. at 708. For a criticism of this assurance, see infra notes 136-40 and accompanying
text.
69 See Jones, 520 U.S. at 708.
70 Id. at 703-04 ("The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III
jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not
sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution.") (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 704. The Court offered no citation for this proposition and it directly
contradicted its holding in Dalton v. Specter. 511 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1994) (finding that
"claims simply alleging that the President has exceeded his authority are not
'constitutional' claims subject to judicial review under the" Franklin exception for review
[Vol. 8:3
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circumstances."'72 Here, the Court is referring to instances in which the President has
been required to testify or make information available in the context of a judicial
proceeding. These grounds illuminate the Court's position: the President will be
subject to the judicial process-as a party, or a witness, or a source of evidence-in
those instances that implicate the Court's "traditional Article III jurisdiction.""
III. JUDICIAL CONFUSION
The Judiciary's confusion stems from a simple misunderstanding: judges fail to
remember that it is a statute they are expounding.74 In each of the Clinton-era
privilege cases, the courts have viewed the separation of powers dispute as placing
the President against the Judiciary. Properly construed, these cases set the President
against the operation of a statute.
A. United States v. Nixon
The seed of this confusion was sown in United States v. Nixon. 75 In Nixon, the
Supreme Court viewed the President's assertion of privilege as being in tension with
"the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions[, which] would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under
of constitutional claims). The Court later referred to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), but,
in Dalton, it construed these cases as limited to the question of whether the President had
violated the Constitution. See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 463. The Court in Dalton expressly
rejected the proposition that the courts have the authority to review presidential action
merely to determine whether the action is within the law. See id, at 472. A claim that
presidential action is ultra vires is not sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction, according
to the Dalton decision. See id, The claim must assert an independent constitutional
violation. See id. The Courts pronouncement in Dalton is deeply flawed. First, it ignores
a fundamental commitment of the Constitution's structure: that the federal government is
a government of limited and enumerated powers. The Dalton decision offers no response
to the argument that ultra vires action is unconstitutional as a violation of this component
of the Constitution's structure. Even taking a clause-bound approach, ultra vires action by
the President violates the Take Care Clause: the President's duty to take care that the law
be faithfully executed includes taking care to comply with the Constitution and the limits
it imposes on governmental action. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Neil Kinkopf, The
Progressive Dilemma, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2000). Nevertheless, the
Court only recently had decided Dalton and ought to have attempted to explain how it
squared with the broad assertion in Jones.
2 See Jones, 520 U.S. at 703.
73 Id. at 702.
7' See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
75 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Article III. ''76 The Court elaborated, "The need to develop all relevant facts in the
adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated ifjudgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts.""
It may have been that the President's assertion of privilege would have conflicted
with the goals of criminal justice. It is odd, though, to conceptualize this conflict as
implicating Article III. If withholding the evidence-in Nixon, the Watergate
tapes-would have thwarted a prosecution, this would have prevented the
effectuation not of Article III, but of the provisions of the federal criminal code that
the Watergate defendants were charged with violating. Article Ill does not create a
criminal justice system or, with one exception, define criminal law.7" Nothing in
Article III required prosecution of the Watergate defendants. Thus, President
Nixon's position with regard to turning over the Watergate tapes was in conflict with
a congressional enactment, and not with any requirement of Article III."'
B. Clinton v. Jones
The Court followed Nixon decision's lead in Clinton v. Jones.80 It saw.the case
as "merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide
cases and controversies."'" This formulation oversimplified the source of federal
jurisdiction. Article III does not conferjurisdiction on the federal courts to hear cases
such as the Jones lawsuit. Instead, Article III generally looks to Congress to
determine whether, and to what extent, to grant the federal courtsjurisdiction to hear
cases.
82
The Clintdn v. Jones decision did not implicatejurisdiction conferred directly by
the Constitution. The authority of the federal courts to hear the Jones case was based
not on Article III, but on the two statutes that confer the vast majority of federal
jurisdiction: the general federal question statute8 3 and the diversity of citizenship
76 Id. at 707.
7 Id. at 709.
78 The lone exception comes in Section 3, which defines treason. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them,
or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.").
" Indeed, the Supreme Court invoked Article III, but never cited the provision of Article
III with which President Nixon's position conflicted. This failure to cite authority has led
a variety of commentators to denounce the opinion as an unfounded assertion of judicial
superiority. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1411
(1999) ("[Nixon] imperialized the Judiciary and marginalized the legislature.").
80 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
81 Id. at 682.
92 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
83 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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statute. 4 As a result, the Jones case did not involve a tension between Article III and
Article II. Rather, the case raised a conflict between the constitutional attributes of
the presidency and the application of a congressional enactment. The question in
Jones was whether the operation of a statute would yield to the President's
institutional interests.85
The Court of Appeals fell into this same trap in Espy. The court declared, "The
President's ability to withhold information from Congress implicates different
constitutional considerations than the President's ability to withhold evidence in
judicial proceedings." 6 Regrettably, Judge Wald's opinion does not identify what
these different considerations might be.8"
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Even though these statutes use the language of Article III,
neither confers jurisdiction to the fullest extent that Article III permits. For example, Article
III allows jurisdiction in any case that presents a federal question. Section 1331, however,
limits federal question jurisdiction to federal questions asserted in a well-pleaded complaint.
See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). It does not
extend jurisdiction to any case in which a significant federal law defense, including a
constitutional defense, is asserted if the plaintiff did not raise a federal question in pleading
its claim. See id
Section 1332 limits diversity jurisdiction even more sharply from the baseline of
constitutional permissibility. It imposes an amount-in-controversy threshold, currently
$75,000, that must be exceeded to invoke federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Moreover, the statute also requires complete diversity of the parties to establish jurisdiction;
if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant, § 1332 denies jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); see also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806). Yet, the Constitution allows jurisdiction under conditions of minimal diversity,
where at least one claimant is diverse from a defendant. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
Congress enacted the federal interpleader statute on this understanding. See 28 U.S.C. §
1335.
85 See Jones, 520 U.S. at 685.
86 Id. at 753.
87 The opinion cites two academic treatments of executive privilege, neither of which
establishes the proposition for which the court cites them. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at
142-57; Norman Dorsen & John Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the
Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L. REv. 1 (1974). Professor Rozell draws the same distinction as the
court but similarly fails to explain why the arena in which the claim of executive privilege
is asserted should affect the constitutional analysis. Professor Rozell aptly notes that
Congress has political tools available to force disclosure. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 148-
49. These tools are not available to the Judiciary. See id. at 151. Yet, it is not clear why or
how this bears on the question of whether the privilege applies and, if so, whether it is
overcome by countervailing considerations. Vague intimations of Richard Nixon's lawyer,
James St. Clair, aside, no President has defied a court order to submit to judicial process.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-five
Years, 83 MtNN. L. REv. 1337, 134-49 (1999). At least one commentator, however,
apparently believes that this would be permissible. See id.
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C. Constitutional Structure
Readers of the Federalist should not have been surprised at the Court's
confusion, or that its confusion would influence its separation of powers analysis.
Madison anticipated that each branch would be ambitious and would seek to expand
its power.88 Moreover, each branch was expected to be vigilant in protecting its turf
against incursions by the other branches. 9 The Constitution is designed to cultivate
and to capitalize on these institutional instincts. 9°
In the privilege cases, however, the Judiciary's self-defense instinct leads it to
conceptual confusion. In each case involving the Clinton Administration, the
Judiciary saw the asserted privilege as representing a threat to the constitutional
powers of the judicial branch.9 Having perceived a threat, the Judiciary naturally
placed little weight on the asserted privilege.
Because the Constitution structures the branches in opposition to one another, the
power of each can be understood only in relation to the power of the others.92 By
minimizing the importance of the presidential privilege, the Judiciary can be
understood to have placed relatively greater weight on its own institutional interests
and to have asserted its own power. Thus, the courts responded to the threats to their
own position as the Constitution's structure anticipates they will-by acting in self-
defense and according little value to the competing interests of the other branches.93
IV. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
Dispelling the illusion that claims of executive privilege implicate the Judiciary's
constitutional position, we find a recurring issue of statutory construction: a broadly
applicable statute that presents genuine separation of powers concerns if applied to
the President. In construing such statutes, the Court repeatedly has invoked the Clear
Statement Rule: a court interprets the statute to apply to the President only if it
clearly expresses this application.' The reason for this rule is simple and sound.9"
88 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9 See id. at 321-22.90 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
91 See supra Pt. II.
92 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 88, at 322-23 (James Madison).
93 This is also how the general separation of powers principle has been applied. The
only two cases in which the Court has held that a statute violates the general separation of
powers principle have involved legislative encroachment on the Judiciary. See Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982); Hayburn's Case,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 412 (1792).
' The requirement that the separation of powers concern be genuine is an important
qualification, although the executive branch sometimes overlooks it. See Memorandum
from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Jack Quinn,
Counsel to the President (Dec. 18, 1995) (visited Apr. 9,2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
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Due regard for separation of powers dictates that Congress and the President
expressly consider the ramifications of applying a general statute to the President and
provide assurances that the statute will not apply in away that impairs the President's
ability to function within the constitutional structure of government." Once a
statute's scope is clearly determined to include the President, the Court is extremely
deferential to the implicitjudgment of the political branches that such application is
consistent with the constitutional separation of powers.9" When it is not evident that
Congress ever considered whether the statute would apply to the President, the
justification for deference is attenuated because the enactment of the statute no longer
clearly implies ajudgment by the political branches that applying the statute to the
President will not upset the constitutional balance of power between the branches."
mem ops.htm> (stating that statutes "'are construed not to include the President unless
there is a specific indication that Congress intended to cover the Chief Executive."'
(quoting Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to Egil Krogh, Staff Assistant to the Counsel to the President (Apr. 1,
1969))); see also The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and
Congress, Op. Off. Legal Counsel (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
memops.htm>. This qualification is important because it distinguishes the rule of
construction from Richard Nixon's famous assertion that "When the President does it that
means it is not illegal." Excerpts from Interview with Nixon about Domestic Effects of
Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A 16 (interview by David Frost).
" This is not to say that clear statement rules generally are appropriate or sound. See
generally RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985);
William Eskridge & Phillip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992).
9 Similarly, the Court has adopted the Clear Statement Rule for questions involving the
vertical separation of powers--that is, federalism. In that context, the Clear Statement Rule
is designed also to accord due regard to the sovereignty of the states and to ensure that the
federal government has considered the ramifications of applying a generally applicable
statute in that unique setting. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act would apply to the mandatory retirement
age of state judges only if the statute clearly covered this situation); see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 354-62 (2000)
(discussing interpretive canons used to protect state authority from federal encroachment).
" See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel
statute, which clearly was designed to limit the President's control over prosecutorial
functions vested in the independent counsel); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425 (1977) (applying a highly deferential standard to determine whether the
Presidential Records Act violated the separation of powers doctrine).
, This rule of construction is closely related to the so-called avoidance canon, under
which the courts will construe a statute to avoid raising constitutional questions if there is
an alternative ground on which to decide the case. For example, the Supreme Court refused
to interpret the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 1 et seq.
(1994), which requires open meetings by advisory committees that comprise members who
are not federal officials, as applying to the American Bar Association's Committee on
Judicial Nominations. The Court's rationale was to avoid the serious separation of powers
2000]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
The federal Judiciary is not a political branch. Thejudicial branch is designed
to be insulated from politics in order "to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws."99 The Constitution grants federal judges life tenure,
during good behavior, and provides that their salaries may not be reduced while in
office.'I°  Because federal judges may be removed only in extraordinary
circumstances, they are not subject formally to the supervision and control of any
other political actor or constituency. The federal Judiciary's independence and
insulation from politics render it institutionally the least competent branch to make
political judgments.
Following the implications of this design, the courts have at times strained the
text of a statute to conclude that it does not cover the President. For example, the
Supreme Court in Franklin v. Massachusetts'' held that the Administrative
Procedure Act's (APA)0 2 provision ofjudicial review of final agency action does not
apply to final administrative action undertaken by the President. 3
The APA grants to the Judiciary thejurisdiction to review final agency actions.'04
The APA defines an "agency" to be:
each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it
is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include--(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the
governments ofthe territories or possessions ofthe United States; (D) the
government of the District of Columbia. 5
On a straight textual analysis, the term agency would seem to encompass the Office
of the President.0 6 That office is, under any natural usage, an "authority of the
concerns that would arise if this advisory function could not be performed in confidence.
Achieving that construction, however, meant significant interpretive contortions. See Public
Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443 (1989) ("[W]e cannot believe
that [FACA] was intended to cover every formal and informal consultation between the
President or an Executive agency and a group rendering advice."). The District of Columbia
Circuit also employed the avoidance canon to FACA in holding that the First Lady is a
government official; therefore, the President's health care task force was not subject to
FACA. See Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898
(1993). For a criticism of this approach, see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 71 (1995).
9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 88, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
'0o See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
101 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
102 5 U.S.C. § 551 etseq. (1994).
103 See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796.
'o See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
,os 5 U.S.C §§ 551(1), 701(b)(1).
" The Office of the President is an administrative unit that encompasses the President
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Government of the United States.' ' 107 Under the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), the express
exception of other potentially covered authorities strengthens the textual case that the
term agency includes the Office of the President. The heads of the other branches of
the federal government are excluded under the first two exceptions.' Application
of the expressio unius maxim would suggest that the two exceptions were strong
evidence that the head of the branch that was not excepted-the President-is
included. Nevertheless, the Court in Franklin refused to read the APA's judicial
review provisions to cover the President unless expressly provided by the statute.'09
To support this position, the Court cited Nixon v. Fitzgerald,"' which it
characterized as holding that the "Court would require an explicit statement by
Congress before assuming Congress had created a damages action against the
President."' 11
The Jones case presented a peculiarly apt setting for the application of the Clear
Statement Rule. The Court pointed to the two major federal jurisdiction statutes as
the source of federal court authority to hear the lawsuit." 2 Federal courts have
"jurisdiction of all civil actions arising underthe Constitution, laws, ortreaties ofthe
United States."' 3 Federal courts also have "jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between citizens of different states."' " Neither of these jurisdictional
statutes states that it applies to the President. Indeed, the primary setting in which
these statutes operate likely involves civil litigation among private individuals or
corporations. The APA, by contrast, operates exclusively in the context of federal
administrative action.'
The clear statement rule avoids interpreting legislation to alter the balance of
governmental power when Congress has not expressed statutorily such an intention
and his closest staff. It is a subset of the Executive Office of the President. See Kissinger v.
Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 455 U.S. 136 (1980); see also infra note 144.
107 5 U.S.C §§ 551(1), 701(b)(1).
108 See id.
'o See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional
position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject
the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express
statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance
of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 800-01.
"10 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
"' Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801.
11 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 685 (1997).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
114 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
"' See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796-801.
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and thus has not rendered, even implicitly, a judgment that the alteration is
constitutionally permissible. In fact, because Congress appears to have made an
exhaustive review of the APA's applicability to the spectrum of federal authorities,
it is conceivable that Congress also considered the possibility that the statute might
apply to the President. "6 The federal question and diversityjurisdiction statutes, by
contrast, do not waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government or operate
primarily as mechanisms to regulate the behavior of federal agencies or officials." 7
Nothing on the face of these statutes would draw Congress' attention to the
separation of powers question that President Clinton raised in Jones. ,1"
The Jones case also directly implicated the clear statement rule's competency
rationale. The President's arguments in Jones were political, as is inevitable with
such a separation of powers issue. He argued that the burdens of civil litigation
would substantially distract him from the duties of his office and that civil litigation
would be used as a political weapon." 9 The Supreme Court responded that, "Most
frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary
judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the defendant."'20 It is difficult
to imagine a group of nine lawyers believing this assertion at the time the opinion was
written.'2 ' In hindsight, each ofthe President's assertions seems powerful, while the
Court's response appears preposterous and naive. In light of subsequent events, the
116 See id For example, the list of exceptions demonstrates that Congress thought about
how the statute should apply to Congress, the territories, and the District of Columbia. It
is not much of a leap to conclude that Congress probably thought about whether the APA
might also apply to the President.
..7 Of course, the jurisdiction statutes regulate the Article III Judiciary by defining the
cases to which the judicial power extends. The APA is designed to grant the federal
Judiciary the authority to review the administrative actions of federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 581. The federal question and diversity jurisdiction statutes are designed to grant the
federal Judiciary jurisdiction to hear a broad range of controversies, mainly involving
parties that are wholly private. See 28 U.S.C.§§ 1331-1332.
18 Shifting the focus to the federal statutes creating the federal causes of action at issue
in Jones (Title VII and § 1983) would not alter this point. The application of these statutes
to a sitting president is far removed from the context in which each would typically operate.
119 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692-706 (1997).
n2 Id. at 708.
121 It may not be implausible, however, in the case of the nine justices that decided
Clinton v. Jones. The relevant background for Jones would have included significant
experience with contemporary litigation and a substantial political office. None of the
justices possessed either. By virtue of the experience of each of the individual justices, the
Court was singularly unqualified to comprehend the issues and arguments involved in that
case. See Verbatim, The Chron. Higher Educ., Sept. 24, 1999 ("If [the Supreme Court] is
going to settle politically charged cases, it seems to me the relevant experience is politics.
If you go back to the Supreme Court of the 40s and 50s, justices had substantial
experience .... Today we have these kind-of virgins-nine justices whose cumulative
political experience is slight.").
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prospect of politically motivated litigation against a President seems anything but
remote.'
22
The most significant error in Jones, however, was not the Court's political
judgment. Rather, the most important misstep was the Court's decision to attempt
a political judgment at all. The Clear Statement Rule reflects the understanding that
the Judiciary is not well-equipped to make political judgments; indeed, it is designed
to be ill-equipped to make such determinations.2 2 For this reason, the Court
repeatedly defers to the expressed, or fairly implied, judgment of the political
branches in separation of powers cases," and it abstains from supplyingajudgment
in cases in which the political branches cannot be fairly understood to have spoken.
Distracted by the misperception that its own turf was at stake, the Court in Jones
failed to recognize that the political branches had never made the judgment that the
general federal civil jurisdiction statutes would not upset the separation of powers if
applied to the President, even for suits arising from occurrences that pre-date his term
in office.
The Court in Nixon, by contrast, came to the correct conclusion because it
involved enforcement ofthe criminal law. 25 It simply presents no genuine separation
of powers issue to say that the President is subject to the prohibitions of the federal
criminal code. Thus, the President may not commit mail fraud or bribery. Applying
these proscriptions to the President in no way threatens any separation of powers
value.
The ratification debates demonstrate the understanding that the President would
be subjectto the criminal laws. 26 Opponents of the Constitution's ratification raised
as a chief objection the prospect of a President who, like a monarch, would not be
'z To its speculation that summary judgment would prove an effective defense against
political harassment, the court added its conclusion, "History indicates that the likelihood
that a significant number of such cases will be filed is remote." Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 709
(1997). History now demonstrates that "a significant number of such cases" is one.
123 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
124 Where the political branches, through bicameralism and presentment, have
determined that an institutional arrangement does not upset the proper balance of
governmental power, the Court will not second guess their assessment. See, e.g., Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (holding that a court will invalidate an act of
Congress only for compelling constitutional reasons); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988) (emphasizing the importance of a congressional determination). Even when
applying an anti-aggrandizement analysis, the Court does not make a judgment about
whether a given measure will in fact yield a shift in power among the branches. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) (refusing to engage in a "judicial assessment"
of how a statute might, as a "practical result," affect the balance of power between the
branches).
"2 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
126 This Essay does not offer an opinion as to whether a criminal indictment may be
issued, or a trial commenced, against a President while still in office.
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subject to the proscriptions of the criminal law.'27 Advocates of ratification
repeatedly highlighted the President's amenability to law as an important feature of
the document. 28 These considerations find expression in the text ofthe Constitution.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust, or profit under the United States, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and
punishment, according to law. 29
It is a fundamental premise of the structure of the presidency that the President is not
exempt from the criminal law.
The Nixon case presented these fundamental considerations. The investigation
in that case centered on criminal wrongdoing by the President and his close aides and
advisers. 30  President Nixon had been named an unindicted co-conspirator.'
Compelling the President to comply with a subpoena duces tecum under these
circumstances does not generate tension with the constitutional separation of powers.
Given the fundamental commitment that the President be subject to criminal
proscriptions, compliance with the subpoena was consonant with the constitutional
structure of the office.
The problem with Nixon is not the decision itself, but the way it has come to be
understood, especially in Espy. The court in Espy did not pay careful attention to the
factual setting of the prosecutor's request for information. The investigation of
Secretary Espy did not implicate even remotely the possibility of presidential
involvement. Absorbed by concern for its own constitutional turf, the District of
Columbia Circuit asserted the mechanisms of criminal law enforcement as a proxy
127 See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted
in THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 53, 66 (W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds., 1985)
(espressing the fear that the President may use his power to "screen from punishment the
most treasonable attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people");George Mason,
Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention, 1787, reprinted
in THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST, supra, at 11, 12 (expressing the fear that the President
might use his power to "screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to
commit [a] crime, and thereby prevent discovery of his own guilt").
28 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69 vol. 2, at 40, 41 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The
President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction
of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would
afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.").
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added).
30 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687-88 (1974). Although President Nixon
was not a named defendant, he was an unindicted co-conspirator.
... See id at 687.
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for its own Article III powers.'32 This led the court to discount the force of the
President's privilege claim. The court ignored the possible chilling effect of
overriding executive privilege in a context like Espy. Future presidents will be
hamstrung in their ability to conduct any sort of internal investigation into allegations
of wrongdoing. Undermining the ability of the President to root out misfeasance
within the executive branch does not advance the values underlying the constitutional
structure of an independent executive.
Espy's formulation ofthe standard governing executive privilege in the criminal
law context-that evidence be "directly relevant"'-is less troublesome than how
courts understand that standard. As long as courts erroneously see their own
constitutional position at stake in these disputes, they predictably will undervalue
legitimate assertions of need to keep presidential communications confidential.
Judges should understand that their constitutional position is not implicated
significantly when they accommodate generally applicable criminal procedure
statutes, which were enacted without regard for the peculiar setting of investigations
of the executive branch, to that unique and delicate setting.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Judicial Response
The Court's approach to constitutional privilege claims is basically sound.
Conceptualizing the issue as one of separation of powers is appropriate. Within the
separation of powers setting, the Judiciary typically and properly defers to the
judgment of the political branches.'34  Problems arise when the Court
mischaracterizes the separation of powers issue as implicating the constitutional
functions of the Judiciary. This leads the Court to be less deferential and, as seen in
Jones, to venture political judgments on questions that the political branches have not
addressed.'35 The Clinton-era privilege litigation demonstrates how important it is for
the Court to characterize properly the nature of the separation of powers issue before
it and to apply its Clear Statement Rule in order to refrain from filling a void with its
own political judgment.
The specific harm ofJones-that civil litigation is available as a political weapon
against the President-remains on the books. 36 An exploration of all the possible
systemic ramifications of political litigation is beyond the scope of this Essay. 37 The
132 See Espy, 121 F.3d 729, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
... Id. at 754.
134 See supra note 124.
... See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
136 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
117 Political litigation may have some salutary consequences. For example, subjecting the
President to the various discovery mechanisms authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
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Jones litigation and its aftermath-the Lewinsky investigation and the impeachment
proceedings-show that there are some significant problems with political litigation.
The most pernicious consequence may be what can be referred to as distraction. By
occupying the time and attention of the President and Congress for such a lengthy
period, the matter necessarily displaced other policy items from the agendas of those
institutions.
Political scientists write about the importance of agenda-setting. First, whoever
controls the agenda-the order and timing in which matters are considered---can
control outcomes. Second, Congress and the President can complete a finite set of
business, which is markedly smaller than the set of demands for action placed on
those institutions. Consequently, the ability to set the agenda and determine what
actions .will be considered, and in what order, can shape and, under certain
circumstances, even control which actions are taken and which are neglected or
rejected.'38
The Jones precedent allows any individual or organization that can muster a
colorable civil lawsuit to exert substantial influence over, or even to commandeer, the
agenda of the federal government. Yet, these litigants are private individuals or
organizations which are not democratically accountable. Thus, Jones grants
unaccountable actors significant control over the agenda of the federal government.
The Jones case itself provides an illustration. The lawsuit would not have
proceeded without the funding of a political organization that was opposed to the
President-the Rutherford Institute. '39 It would be difficult to overstate the extent to
which the decisions of this organization reshaped the agenda of the federal
government over a period of several years.
Temporary presidential immunity from civil lawsuits would not mean that the
President is entirely immune from investigation of wrongdoing that falls outside the
category of criminal wrongdoing. Congress holds vast investigative and oversight
jurisdiction and is not shy about asserting it. 4° A major difference between a
congressional inquiry and a civil lawsuit is that Congress is democratically
accountable. If oversight and investigation of the Administration occupy too
significant a position on the federal agenda, the public can demand that Congress
curtail or scale back its inquiries and turn its focus to matters the public deems more
worthy of governmental attention. The public ultimately can enforce its demand at
Procedure is apt to afford the public access to a greater quantum of information about the
President.
'~ See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963).
13 See Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's OIC and the Clinton-
Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 681 (1999) ("The Jones case was at this point
being prolonged and financed by ideological opponents of the President, the Rutherford
Institute.").
14o Though vast, this jurisdiction is not unlimited. See, e.g., Kilboum v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1880); see also Schroeder & Kinkopf, supra note 5, at 25.
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the ballot box, but it has no corresponding leverage over a private entity, such as the
Rutherford Institute.
B. A Legislative Response
Edified by the spectacle that followed the Supreme Court's decision in Jones,
Congress should respond by enacting appropriate -legislation. For an analogy,
Congress might look to the statutory regime governing public access to federal
documents. The generally applicable statute is the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).' 4' FOIA grants to the public a right of nearly immediate access to a wide
range of federal information.' The Supreme Court held that FOIA does not apply
to the Office of the President.' The statute covers the Executive Office of the
President,'44 but the Supreme Court relied on legislative history to carve the Office
of the President out of the Executive Office of the President and then to exempt the
Office of the President from FOIA. 45 Subsequently, Congress enacted the
Presidential Records Act (PRA)'46 to regulate the public disclosure of presidential
records.'47 The PRA allows the President to maintain all presidential records and
their confidentiality throughout his term or terms of office and for up to twelve years
thereafter.48
14 5 U.S.C § 552 (1994). Other statutes-such as the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 290 1-are important to the overall system of federal record maintenance and disclosure,
but are not sufficiently analogous to illuminate the issue of temporary presidential immunity
from civil suit.
14' FOIA requires that the agency subject to a request for information make a
determination on the request within 10 days, absent unusual circumstances. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6). FOIA requesters know that in practice it takes much longer to get an actual
response. In addition, FOIA excludes significant categories of information from its
disclosure requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
"41 See Kissinger v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 138
(1980).
'44 The Executive Office of the President (EOP) is a more encompassing entity than the
Office of the President. The EOP includes some of the permanent agencies, staffed largely
by civil servants, that are housed administratively within the White House, such as the
Office of Management and Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers. See White House
Offices and Agencies <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/html/EOP-org.html>. The
Office of the President consists of the President's immediate staff and advisers.
' See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156.
146 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2206.
141 See 44 U.S.C. § 2201.
148 At the conclusion of his presidency, the President must turn over all records to the
Archivist. The President may designate that records containing certain sensitive categories
of information be withheld from access for up to 12 additional years. All other records are
to be disclosed within five years or once the Archivist finishes cataloging them, if that is
completed earlier. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2203-2204.
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In the context of civil litigation, Congress should recognize that the unique status
of the President requires a specifically tailored jurisdictional regime, just as the
generally applicable FOIA does not account adequately for the special sensitivity of
presidential records. As the PRA grants immunity to presidential records from
disclosure during the President's term in office, while at the same time recognizing
that orderly public disclosure thereafter serves a significant public benefit, Congress
should recognize that the President should be immune from civil lawsuits during the
term of his office. Once that term ends, however, it is proper for the President to be
subject to civil lawsuit. The PRA prevents the system of public disclosure from being
used as a political weapon against the President. Congress also should provide a
deterrent against the system of civil litigation being used in a similar fashion.
The plaintiff in Jones raised legitimate concerns regarding the potential effects
of a temporary immunity that could last as long as eight years.'49 The plaintiff's
concerns centered on the possibility that evidence might be lost or difficult to discover
after the temporary immunity finally elapses. 5° The Court chose to vindicate these
interests and to look to "case management" to accommodate the President's
concerns.' Having seen that the tools of case management are ineffective, Congress
should instead try to accommodate the legitimate concern of plaintiffs in the context
of temporary presidential immunity.
This accommodation can be made by requiring the President, should he decide
to invoke the temporary immunity, to post a bond to compensate the plaintiff for any
losses that might result from delaying discovery and trial. The decision whether to
require a bond in a given case and the amount of the bond should be left to the
discretion of the trial judge, who would examine the particular circumstances of the
case and its evidentiary setting. This requirement would be similar to the provision
allowing a judge to require that a plaintiff post a bond as a condition to receiving a
preliminary injunction.'
The following is a draft of what temporary presidential immunity legislation
might look like:
SECTION 1. Once filed, all legal proceedings that may prejudice the
unofficial legal rights of the person serving as President shall be
suspended temporarily during the period for which the person serves as
President without regard to when the events giving rise to such legal
proceedings may have occurred.'
'4 See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (1996).
15o See id.
's' See Clinton v. Jones, 502 U.S. 681, 702 (1997).
152 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
'" This language is modeled on the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.
app. 510 (1994).
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SECTION 2. If a party files a cause of action covered by Section 1, the
district court may, in its discretion, order the President to give security, in
such sum as the court may deem proper, for the payment of such costs
and damages as may be incurred or suffered as a result of the delay
occasioned by the temporary immunity granted by Section 1.
CONCLUSION
The executive privilege cases arising from the Clinton Administration have raised
important separation of powers issues. The judicial misperception that these cases
significantly involved the constitutional role ofthejudiciary has been a source of real
harm to our political system. Nevertheless, it is not too late for Congress and the
courts to take appropriate action to prevent mischief in the future.
